{"id":146,"date":"2026-05-20T06:04:59","date_gmt":"2026-05-20T06:04:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/housingnewsamerica.com\/?p=146"},"modified":"2026-05-20T06:04:59","modified_gmt":"2026-05-20T06:04:59","slug":"orbans-fall-and-europes-rise","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/housingnewsamerica.com\/?p=146","title":{"rendered":"Orban\u2019s Fall and Europe\u2019s Rise"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Sometime during the late 1800s, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire still stretched from the Adriatic Sea to modern-day Ukraine, a Hungarian entered a bookstore in Vienna and asked the clerk, \u201cCan you sell me a globe of Hungary?\u201d Although likely apocryphal, the story has been widely repeated because it so perfectly captures the hubris of a people who feel their nation is the world. Of course, within a generation, Hungary would be stripped of two-thirds of its territory by the Treaty of Trianon, making the globe-buyer\u2019s pride seem less farcical and almost tragic in retrospect.<\/p>\n

Read more Why Mexico\u2019s Cartels Are So Hard to Defeat<\/a><\/p>\n

But the story takes on yet another meaning today because, in the wake of the April 12 parliamentary elections in Hungary, it has been non-Hungarians who have been asking to see the globe of Hungary. Moderate and liberal political observers not only in Vienna but also in Brussels, Paris, Berlin, and New York see the crushing defeat of strongman Viktor Orban as signaling the ebbing of global illiberalism. The hope is that where Hungary goes, the world will follow: far-right candidates such as Marine Le Pen, for instance, will not win in France, and the far-right political party Alternative for Germany (AfD) will not triumph in Germany.<\/p>\n

But just like the perspective of the original globe-buyer, this view is far from reality. Peter Magyar, the new prime minister of Hungary, won because of a wave of antiestablishment energy that can just as easily benefit populist contenders in other countries. In the recent Bulgarian elections, for instance, the political party of the former president, Rumen Radev, whom Western media describe as a Russophile and Euroskeptic, ran and won on an anticorruption campaign similar to Magyar\u2019s in Hungary\u2014proving that powerful anticorruption rhetoric can bring to power not only Orban\u2019s opponents but also the kinds of political leaders usually seen as his allies.<\/p>\n

If anything, once elected to power, national populists in Europe will continue looking for ways to remake liberal democratic regimes, and Orban\u2019s playbook will still be viewed as extremely valuable. Indeed, his defeat does not signal the end of far-right politics in Europe but rather an end to the illusion that Trumpism is a global movement. By accepting defeat and not challenging the outcome, as Trump did in 2020 and has promised to do again, Orban reaffirmed the democratic credentials of Europe\u2019s new right. And as a fellow conservative, Magyar represents not a repudiation of Orban-style nationalism but its evolution.<\/p>\n

His victory signals a new era for European politics. By distancing itself from Trump, the far right in Europe may actually push the continent toward a new consensus\u2014one in which pro-European elites are ready to accept the centrality of the nation-states in the future of European integration while far-right parties accept that Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, not Brussels, are the real threat to their national sovereignties. Europe, in other words, might finally become more European.<\/strong><\/p>\n

How Orban Lost Hungary<\/strong><\/h3>\n

In many ways, Orban, Europe\u2019s longest-serving prime minister, had become for the political right what, decades ago, Fidel Castro was for the political left: a leader of a small, relatively unimportant nation who nonetheless captured the world\u2019s imagination. He made Hungary the intellectual, institutional, and financial hub of Europe\u2019s new right. If you were a far-right intellectual, Budapest would treat you like a king. If you were a far-right party, Hungarian banks would gladly help you with a loan. If you were a Polish former right-wing minister (such as Zbigniew Ziobro) or a former North Macedonian prime minister hiding from justice (such as Nikola Gruevski), Budapest would grant you political asylum.<\/p>\n

Orban\u2019s original electoral revolution, in 2010, was mostly a revolt against the corruption of the previous socialist government. But it was his fierce opposition to Angela Merkel\u2019s plan to open the borders of the EU for the refugees coming from the Syrian war that made him a player in European politics. His revolt against Berlin and Brussels was read as an attempt to upend the role of midsize European nation-states in global politics. He positioned himself as the indispensable middleman: he became Trump\u2019s ideological ally, but also Vladimir Putin\u2019s closest geopolitical friend and China\u2019s most reliable economic partner within the EU. In the age of Trump\u2014when politics and diplomacy increasingly revolved around personal relationships between leaders rather than shared interests between states\u2014this positioning seemed to offer Hungary extraordinary leverage. Budapest continued buying cheap Russian gas, and Chinese investment in Hungary was higher than in Germany and France. Budapest was even discussed as the setting for a meeting between Trump and Putin that was meant to end the war in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Indeed, understanding Orban\u2019s importance in European politics requires understanding the sources of the unprecedented support he received from Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. For Trump, Orban was the face of the Trumpian revolution in Europe. He served, in effect, as the White House\u2019s chief adviser on European politics. And in the same way that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu persuaded Trump that Iran\u2019s regime was fragile, Orban convinced MAGA leaders that eastern Europe shared the sensibilities of America\u2019s red states, and that the continent was merely one electoral cycle behind the United States. For Moscow, Orban served as both informer in chief about the EU and propagandist in chief by spreading Moscow\u2019s talking points about the war in Ukraine. Orban attacked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky relentlessly, plastering the country with anti-Zelensky placards, and openly sided with Russia in its war in Europe. In return, Putin sent the Kremlin\u2019s political technologists to help Orban\u2019s election campaign.<\/p>\n

But perhaps the greatest irony is that, with all these moves, Orban became the very thing he initially tried to destroy: the globalist. In his most recent campaign, foreign policy\u2014not Hungary\u2019s domestic issues\u2014was the focus, and he hosted foreign leaders such as U.S. Vice President JD Vance and secured the endorsement of Argentine President Javier Milei in an attempt to show Hungary\u2019s global significance. But in Orban\u2019s Hungary, as he discovered, globalism is a losing proposition. Magyar\u2019s campaign, by contrast, centered standard-of-living issues and consciously avoided global politics.<\/p>\n

When explaining his earlier electoral victories, Orban used to joke that his name was literally \u201cViktor.\u201d This time, he was defeated by someone whose surname is \u201cMagyar,\u201d which literally translates as \u201cHungarian.\u201d<\/p>\n

How Trump Lost the European Right<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Orban aside, it took time for European leaders to understand that Trump\u2019s second presidency is neither merely transactional nor unpredictable when it comes to Europe. Brussels had prepared for a trade war; what it encountered instead was ideological warfare. The hope that the American president would come to appreciate the usefulness of allies proved misplaced.<\/p>\n

For Trump, the liberal order was not an American order. The Europe that the United States helped build after World War II had, in his view, become anti-American. Although founded and sustained by the United States, the European Union had evolved into a constraint on American power. In Trump\u2019s narrative, the deindustrialization of the United States and the unraveling of its social fabric were the price paid for a liberalism that had outlived its usefulness.<\/p>\n

Read more The Not-So-Quiet American<\/a><\/p>\n

Europe\u2019s sovereigntist turn is here to stay.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The fundamental hypocrisy of the liberal order, in this view, was the supposed equality of states\u2014the fact that Bulgaria is as important as the United States and Washington should follow the same rules as any other state. Trump\u2019s vision of a postliberal order is what the political theoristStephen Holmes has described as \u201chierarchy without order\u201d: a system in which Trump is king and others are lesser actors, some stronger than others, but all revolving around his orbit. Other great powers, such as China and Russia, may enjoy their spheres of privilege, but only so long as they recognize American primacy. This is not traditional spheres-of-influence politics; Trump does not seek cooperation but demands deference.<\/p>\n

Trump, in many ways, represents a paradox: a nationalist who struggles to understand nationalism\u2014especially that of others. His nationalist anti-immigration, anti-green, and anti-woke agenda resonated with far-right voters in Europe. And together with Orban, he created the sense that the world was witnessing a revolutionary turn and that illiberals would inherit the earth. But even as he offered rhetorical support to his ideological allies in Europe, he failed to show them the respect they expected. European far-right leaders were uneasy about Trump\u2019s tariffs last year. Then they opposed his ambitions to annex Greenland.<\/p>\n

Trump\u2019s war in Iran and his attack on the pope proved to be the tipping point. He demanded that Europeans join the war effort even though he didn\u2019t consult them beforehand, and he showed an unprecedented lack of respect for the Catholic Church when he posted AI-doctored images of himself as the pope. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who until this moment was positioning herself as one of Trump\u2019s major supporters in Europe, refused to join the war and criticized his statements about the pope, signaling that the electoral cost of aligning with Trump had become too high. Orban, however, remained silent. Although the rupture between Trumpism and the European far right did not begin in Budapest, it culminated there when Orban\u2019s defeat convinced many leaders of the European far right that association with Trump is politically toxic. It risks branding them as the new globalists.<\/p>\n

How the Kremlin Lost Its Europe Strategy<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Orban\u2019s defeat is an ideological turning point for the European far right, but it is also a geopolitical earthquake. Most immediately, it will alter the Kremlin\u2019s calculations regarding the continent. During the Hungarian election campaign, Bloomberg News reported that it had obtained a transcript of a call between Orban and Putin from October 2025 in which Orban allegedly referred to Hungary as the \u201cmouse\u201d that is ready to assist the Russian \u201clion.\u201d Hungary was most useful to Russia in vetoing EU efforts to send 90 billion euros (about $105 billion) to Ukraine. With U.S. support to Ukraine waning, Moscow was of the mind that it could prevail as long as Europe remained paralyzed.<\/p>\n

But now that the mouse is gone, the lion must rethink its European strategy. The change of government in Budapest means that Kyiv will finally receive the financial support that could allow Ukraine to continue fighting for at least two more years. Moreover, for Russia, the loss of Orban is a loss of momentum in its strategy to divide and weaken Europe. No current European leader can easily replicate the role Orban played. Those asking who might become the next Orban underestimate how difficult it is to occupy that position. At this point, not even Orban himself could reproduce it. It is therefore unsurprising that pro-government commentators in Moscow have concluded that Russia should harbor no illusions about rapprochement with Europe.<\/p>\n

With Orban gone and Europe accelerating its rearmament, Russian leaders must decide whether political warfare alone will suffice to protect their interests on the continent. His defeat increases the risk that Moscow will consider a much more aggressive strategy, such as cyberattacks and pressure on some of the EU member states. Russian strategists might also want to take advantage of the fact that transatlantic relations are eroding faster than Europe is rearming; in other words, their window to act is now. Short of military action, there is also a higher risk now that Trump, behind the back of Europeans, goes for some kind of grand bargain with Moscow, swapping European interests for business deals with Moscow.<\/p>\n

How Europe Lost Its Extremes<\/strong><\/h3>\n

When it comes to Europe\u2019s internal dynamics, the political shift in Budapest highlights two clear trends that suggest a convergence is happening in the European mainstream. First, Europe\u2019s sovereigntist turn is here to stay. Hungary\u2019s great political upset was not that Orban was defeated by a classical liberal or progressive touting deeper integration with the EU, but that he was beaten by a fellow conservative\u2014one who shares Orban\u2019s original vision of a strong, independent Hungary but rejects the long-serving prime minister\u2019s corruption. Liberal elites are also endorsing the push for national self-determination because of Trump\u2019s bullying and insist on strategic autonomy in defense and technology.Even centrist leaders in Germany and France increasingly envision a sovereign Europe that is not necessarily a federalist one and where foreign and defense policies are not run by Brussels.<\/p>\n

Second, and perhaps surprising given the first, Europe\u2019s new right is becoming less Euroskeptical. It increasingly sees Washington and Moscow\u2014not Brussels\u2014as the primary threats to national sovereignty. Appeals to exit the EU or drop the euro are now viewed as losing proposals. If they hope to gain power, leaders like Le Pen, the AfD, and their allies will likely focus more on national political agendas while distancing themselves from both the United States and Russia. Meloni, with her strong support for Ukraine and cooperation with Brussels, is now the model for this Europe-friendly new right.<\/p>\n

In this context, Orban\u2019s defeat creates space for a new consensus on European sovereignty\u2014one that could potentially include segments of the national populist camp. While political polarization between the European establishment and its challengers remains intense, there are emerging areas of cooperation. Centrist political leaders such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have endorsed some of the anti-immigrant policies of the right, for instance. The current energy crisis triggered by Trump\u2019s war in Iran also forces the parties on the right to temper their criticism of the EU\u2019s green agenda. When it comes to defense, both the voters of the centrist parties and the voters of the far right are supportive of Europe\u2019s rearmament.<\/p>\n

Indeed, at a moment when the radical remaking of the EU is on the agenda, the Hungarian parliamentary elections may prove to be one of the most consequential votes in European politics of the past decade\u2014just not in the way many observers initially thought. So go ahead, look for the globe of Hungary.<\/p>\n

Read more The Not-So-Quiet American<\/a><\/p>\n

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