{"id":283,"date":"2026-06-12T22:08:51","date_gmt":"2026-06-12T22:08:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/housingnewsamerica.com\/?p=283"},"modified":"2026-06-12T22:08:51","modified_gmt":"2026-06-12T22:08:51","slug":"the-fatal-flaw-in-the-transatlantic-alliance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/housingnewsamerica.com\/?p=283","title":{"rendered":"The Fatal Flaw in the Transatlantic Alliance"},"content":{"rendered":"
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When U.S. President Donald Trump returned to the White House, he had his sights set on rebalancing the transatlantic relationship. He would be right to do so. The United States\u2019 burden in NATO is out of proportion with the interests at stake, and regulations set in Brussels have resulted in a lopsided U.S.-EU trade regime. Although it is one of 32 NATO members, the United States covers 16 percent of NATO\u2019s annual budget and shoulders most of the operational and logistical burden for Europe\u2019s security. Meanwhile, the EU has long used tariff and nontariff barriers to limit access for U.S. agricultural and industrial products and has obstructed the operation of American small business and Big Tech with rules and red tape.<\/p>\n

Read more Beware the Europe You Wish For<\/a><\/p>\n

Trump took aim at Europe as soon as he entered office. Shortly after his inauguration, he dispatched Vice President JD Vance and the freshly confirmed U.S. defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, to warn Europeans that Washington\u2019s \u201cnew sheriff\u201d was intent on changing the terms of the relationship. In Paris, Vance called on Europe to lower regulation of artificial intelligence and energy. In Munich, he questioned Europe\u2019s continued commitment to shared Western values. In Brussels, Hegseth announced that the United States could no longer focus primarily on Europe\u2019s security and would be shifting to other priorities. Soon after, Trump levied punitive tariffs designed to pressure Europe to reduce trade barriers and regulations that limit the access of U.S. firms.<\/p>\n

This multifront pressure campaign produced some initial results. At a NATO summit meeting in June, European allies promised to increase their defense spending to five percent of GDP by 2035. In July, Trump and the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced a trade deal committing the EU to purchase $750 billion in American energy products and invest $600 billion in the U.S. market by 2028.<\/p>\n

Yet these successes were at best partial, and perhaps illusory. The five percent pledge by European allies does almost nothing for the United States in the near term, and since today\u2019s leaders cannot credibly bind the hands of future ones, it is an open question whether European countries will ever meet these spending targets. Moreover, the United States has retained control of key leadership positions in NATO, ensuring that Europe\u2019s institutionalized military dependence will endure.<\/p>\n

The trade deal with the EU, formalized as a framework agreement in August, could represent a more substantial adjustment. But for now, it remains an outline. Europe\u2019s ability to meet its multiyear commitments is far from clear, and Brussels continues to resist revising regulations that inhibit the operation of American high-tech companies on the continent. The trade pact is also a one-off, unsupported by any institutional infrastructure. As a result, the impenetrability of EU bureaucracies will continue to limit the United States\u2019 ability to restructure transatlantic economic relations.<\/p>\n

If the Trump administration truly intends to rebalance the relationship with Europe\u2014and to assign it a more proportionate place within American foreign policy\u2014it cannot rely on narrow deals that merely tweak or seek to circumvent existing structures. Instead, it must tackle the basic premises of transatlanticism head on. To do so requires an understanding of the three fateful choices made at NATO\u2019s founding:prioritizing Europe at the expense of the Americas, institutionalizing the military rather than the economic component of the transatlantic relationship, and embedding a regional alliance within a universalist ideological framework. Each decision came with immediately apparent downsides. All have resulted in mounting difficulties in recent years. Until the original premises of transatlantic policy are reconsidered, the relationship will continue to suffer from the same fundamental problems.<\/p>\n

Fortunately, the Trump administration can take steps to address past mistakes and set the transatlantic relationship on a new course. First, Trump should follow through on his commitment to refocus U.S. foreign policy on America\u2019s near abroad, pulling back from Europe and avoiding the hard \u201cpivot to Asia\u201d that previous administrations have pledged. Second, his national security team should insist that NATO confine its activities to the Euro-Atlantic region. Finally, the Trump administration should shift the transatlantic relationship from one based on military cooperation to one centered on economic engagement and technology. The continent would remain an important American partner, but it would no longer be a drain on American resources.<\/p>\n

THE POSTWAR PIVOT<\/h3>\n

For the first century and a half of its history, the United States prioritized a hemispheric foreign policy.In his 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington warned Americans against entanglement with Europe. In his 1823 address to Congress, James Monroe warned Europeans against encroachment into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. efforts to institutionalize a pan-American policy reached their apogee in 1947 with the adoption of the Rio Pact\u2014the first mutual security treaty to be joined by the United States\u2014in which the region\u2019s countries agreed to defend one another if attacked.<\/p>\n

When the United States joined NATO in 1949, American policymakers pointed to the Rio Pact as a precedent and drew analogies between the alliance\u2019s founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Monroe Doctrine. NATO had obvious appeal at the time. Europe, the world\u2019s richest region, had been devastated by war and could be incorporated into the U.S. sphere comparatively cheaply. American officials were also concerned that if the United States did not gain a foothold in Europe, it would cede ground in the region to the Soviet Union, its strongest competitor.<\/p>\n

But the postwar pivot to Europe proved to be a rejection, rather than an extension, of the United States\u2019 traditional hemispheric policy and came at a clear cost to U.S. interests in the Americas. Over the course of the Cold War, Washington abandoned or ignored previous positive projects in Latin America in favor of a reactive (and ineffective) policy of anticommunist intervention. Rare attempts to revitalize U.S. efforts in the region, such as President John F. Kennedy\u2019s Alliance for Progress, an aid program in Latin America, ultimately failed to attract sufficient resources and devolved into further support for whatever local security forces claimed to be combating communism.<\/p>\n

When American ambition (and NATO) expanded after the Cold War\u2019s end, attention to the Western Hemisphere dwindled further. Security at the southern border of the United States became a major domestic concern as powerful cartels entrenched themselves in Mexico and Central America. The United States remained at odds with Cuba\u2014a former ally of the now defunct Soviet Union and the keystone of the Caribbean, only 100 miles off the Florida coast\u2014and, after the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998, lost constructive relations with Venezuela, which possesses the world\u2019s largest proven oil reserves. Meanwhile, investment opportunities throughout the region have increasingly gone to non-U.S. companies.<\/p>\n

BOOTS ON THE GROUND<\/h3>\n

When the United States shifted its attention across the Atlantic in the early postwar period, its priority was economic engagement\u2014both to create export markets for American companies and to inoculate the European continent against communism. The Marshall Plan, announced in 1947, translated this priority into policy: providing billions in aid to support economic rebuilding and stabilization across the continent, encouraging the adoption of American industrial standards, and reducing trade barriers. Yet the project was short-lived, and Washington soon passed the baton of economic integration to the Europeans themselves. When the Marshall Plan ended in 1951, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands created the European Coal and Steel Community, planting the seeds for the development of an economic union with the power to exclude America from the market it had helped to create.<\/p>\n

Whereas European reconstruction and economic integration was an American initiative that the Europeans later pursued on their own, mutual security began as a European concern before becoming a permanent American burden. In 1947, the United Kingdom and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty, providing for their mutual defense. In 1948, they were joined by Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in signing the Brussels Treaty. In 1949, the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, accepting what became a long-term role in western European security.<\/p>\n

Even then, many in the United States did not think it needed to indefinitely protect western Europe. George Kennan, the American diplomat and architect of containment, was initially skeptical of the need for a transatlantic alliance. He believed that the western Europeans\u2019 focus on military security resulted from \u201ctheir failure to understand correctly their own position\u201d and from misjudging the primarily political nature of the communist threat. As far as Kennan was concerned, American accession to the North Atlantic Treaty was a psychological salve to \u201cstiffen the self-confidence\u201d of the western Europeans so that they could turn their attention to the real priorities of economic reconstruction and political stabilization.<\/p>\n

The transatlantic relationship has endured as a purely military arrangement.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Four decades later, the Soviet bloc collapsed, and Russian soldiers retreated. Yet American forces remained, and NATO not only endured but also expanded\u2014over the objections of Kennan and others. The persistence of this military alliance can best be explained by a lack of alternative Atlanticist structures. North America and Europe are bound by no institution aside from NATO. For former members of the Warsaw Pact and for the new post-Soviet states, NATO membership was the only ticket into the American club and the security and economic benefits it offered. For Washington, NATO\u2019s continued existence was the simplest way to secure and expand the United States\u2019 sphere of influence.<\/p>\n

Yet, as many observers predicted,attempts to extend transatlantic cohesion through NATO expansion ultimately provoked a Russian reaction that a transatlantic relationship premised on economic cooperation might not have had. A 2008 NATO summit declaration in Budapest promising future membership for Georgia and Ukraine was followed by wars in both countries.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the creation of the European Union in 1993exacerbated the tensions within the transatlantic alliance. While the United States has paid the costs\u2014and assumed the risks\u2014of an ever-growing security sphere, it has had no formal say in the political, legal, and economic structures of Europe. This has benefited Brussels and Berlin at Washington\u2019s expense. The transatlantic relationship, created to extend American economic leverage in Europe, has endured as a purely military arrangement.<\/p>\n

Read more NATO Without America<\/a><\/p>\n

NATO GOES GLOBAL<\/h3>\n

The U.S. postwarfocus on Europe was initially driven by regional interests, but American foreign policy quickly took on a global orientation. Before the United States even joined NATO, U.S. decision-makers considered creating a worldwide anticommunist alliance. On March 23, 1948, officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada met secretly to explore the possibility of a worldwide \u201cpact of the free nations\u201d under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Although they decided against pursuing this option in the short term, they \u201cagreed that any approach adopted should not prejudice an ultimate development in this direction.\u201d<\/p>\n

American policymakers continued to push for a globally interconnected security system even as they committed the United States to a regional transatlantic alliance. Senator Warren Magnuson, for example, a Democrat from Washington State, combined a vote for the North Atlantic Treaty with a call for \u201ca similar pact for the Pacific.\u201d \u201cIf we are going to assume the leadership of all the free peoples of the world, and of those who would be free,\u201d he explained, \u201cof course we cannot limit the work we are undertaking to do to one geographical area of the world.\u201d<\/p>\n

Kennan, by contrast, emphasized the steep costs of continuing to expand American security commitments: \u201cBeyond the Atlantic area, which is a clean-cut concept, and which embraces a real community of defense interest firmly rooted in geography and tradition, there is no logical stopping point in the development of a system of anti-Russian alliances until that system has circled the globe,\u201d he wrote in a memo that year. Such a policy, he continued, could \u201clead only to one of two results; either all these alliances become meaningless declarations . . . or this country becomes still further over-extended, politically and militarily.\u201d<\/p>\n

Despite Kennan\u2019s advice, American commitments continued to proliferate.In 1950, NSC-68\u2014a National Security Council report viewed as the seminal strategic document of the Cold War\u2014defined the United States\u2019 overarching aim as the buildup of \u201cthe political, economic, and military strength of the free world,\u201d a concept American policymakers identified with the entire noncommunist world. In the first half of the 1950s, NATO membership was extended to include Greece, Turkey, and West Germany. Over that period, Washington rimmed the periphery of the \u201ccommunist world\u201d with three more \u201cfree world\u201d alliances: ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States), SEATO (Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and CENTO (an alliance between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, which the United States orchestrated without joining).<\/p>\n

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Atlanticists assumed that liberal democracy would naturally extend to the ends of the earth. When this didn\u2019t materialize, they blamed various bad actors, from terrorists to totalitarians. The Biden administration completed the reversion to a Cold War frame, declaring a global divide between democracies and autocracies, with China and Russia reprising their roles as principal foes. And once again, the transatlantic relationship was instrumentalized to serve the interests of the larger \u201cliberal order\u201d: NATO members were encouraged to increase their military cooperation with allies in East Asia, while Japan and South Korea attended NATO summits and were vocal in their support for Ukraine. Even after Trump\u2019s reelection, European officials have continued to invoke linkages between China and Russia in an effort to maintain American military engagement on the continent.<\/p>\n

RIGHTING THE WRONGS<\/h3>\n

The Trump administration\u2019s approach to Europe so far has not been sufficient to dislodge the foundations of the transatlantic relationship as it has stood for 75 years. But the good news for Trump is that he still has over three years to push the United States toward a foreign policy that truly puts U.S. interests first.<\/p>\n

To start, the Trump administration should regionalize the transatlantic relationship, turning its focus back to Europe and the North Atlantic, where it should have been along. Trump and his national security team have stopped talking about the \u201clatticework\u201d that ties Washington\u2019s European and Asian allies together and no longer promote NATO as a core building block of any sort of liberal international order. They have also urged NATO members to focus on security issues in their own backyards over those in the Indo-Pacific. But Trump will need to do more to keep the U.S.-European relationship regionally contained, especially in the defense domain.<\/p>\n

To ensure that the scope of the transatlantic commitment\u2014and NATO\u2019s remit\u2014does not expand further, the United States should begin discussions to formally close the alliance\u2019s open door, foreclosing the chance for future expansion. The United States should also make sure that the alliance\u2019s activities remain squarely focused on Europe. Washington should insist that NATO planning documents focus only on Euro-Atlantic security challenges, including direct threats to NATO territory, maritime security in waters surrounding the continent, and cyberthreats from state and nonstate actors. The United States should also withhold support for any operations outside NATO\u2019s current boundaries suggested by other members of the alliance, including naval transits of the Taiwan Strait and no-fly zones over Ukraine.<\/p>\n

The United States should focus on technology and economic cooperation with Europe.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Second, Trump will need to force Europe to assume more responsibility for its own defense\u2014and not just on paper. This might not require a U.S. withdrawal from NATO, but it will demand significant retrenchment of U.S. forces and a literal interpretation of the alliance\u2019s cornerstone document, Article 5, to narrow the scope of the U.S. military commitment to Europe in a crisis. Although Article 5 is often described as requiring member states to deploy troops to provide direct support if any other member is a victim of aggression, the actual commitment is more limited. The treaty states only that in the event of an attack, members \u201cwill assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.\u201d The United States could meet this standard by offering military assistance or logistical support, for example, rather than putting U.S. soldiers on the frontline.<\/p>\n

Especially important will be the withdrawal of ground combat and air forces based in Germany, Poland, and Romania, which represent the core of the U.S. military commitment in the region. Removing most of these forces will make it easier for Washington to keep any U.S. role in future European conflicts limited by reducing both the risk of entanglement and the temptation U.S. policymakers might feel to support direct involvement.Institutional changes will also be needed. The Trump administration should begin talks with NATO allies to ensure that Europeans rather than Americans can fill top civilian and military posts, including the position of the next supreme allied commander of NATO. And it should rewrite NATO plans to reduce the U.S. forward defense and frontline role and instead assign U.S. forces in Europe to support functions, including intelligence, logistics, and other strategic enablers.<\/p>\n

After downsizing its military footprint in Europe, the United States should work to build a new bedrock for transatlantic ties focused on technology and economic cooperation. This project will require new institutions to formalize engagement and strengthen partnerships in areas including AI, pharmaceuticals, and critical minerals. U.S. leadership in the space and cybertechnology fields could also be reinforced through cooperation with Europe. The new trade deal that Trump recently closed with the EU could be the starting point for building new cooperative mechanisms and mutually beneficial ties. Progress on issues such as requirements for technology transfers and sharing and the harmonization of regulatory standards should be areas of particular focus.<\/p>\n

Finally, the Trump administration should not repeat the mistakes of 1949 by using the retrenchment to do a hard pivot to Asia, complete with the construction of new collective security organizations, an expanded military footprint, and efforts to build a global coalition to contain a feared adversary (this time, China). Such a move is widely advocated by U.S. foreign policy experts and China hawks, but it would once again leave the United States overextended and risk drawing the country into conflict far from its own shores. In any case, the current U.S. military presence in Asia is more than sufficient to secure U.S. interests.<\/p>\n

THE PIVOT HOME<\/h3>\n

The United States should instead pivot home. Trump should take the resources and strategic bandwidth freed by a smaller U.S. military role in Europe and refocus U.S. energy in the Western Hemisphere. Border and port security and air and missile defense of the homeland are areas in which military power will be essential. But even after investment in these areas, the reduction in U.S. military commitments in Europe will allow the United States to get leaner, creating budget space for domestic priorities, including infrastructure, education, and paying down the national debt.<\/p>\n

The Trump administration should work with regional partners to address the root causes of migration and allocate more resources to the law enforcement agencies best trained to deal with issues such as human and drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. Washington can also focus on increasing its investment across Latin America, both to take advantage of the region\u2019s abundant natural resources and to build stronger ties with U.S. neighbors\u2014including those with which the United States has a history of conflict. Washington could include Greenland, which is part of North America, in its new hemispheric policy, finding mutually beneficial areas for cooperation, from extracting critical minerals to setting up new military operating locations to reinforce security in the northern Atlantic.<\/p>\n

Although this pivot home will not be complete in four years, the Trump administration has a unique opportunity to rebalance the transatlantic relationship and cure its pathologies. When this rebalancing is accomplished, it will be an enduring achievement that will position the United States for the challenges and opportunities of the next 75 years.<\/p>\n

Read more The Allies After America<\/a><\/p>\n

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